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recover damages and antitrust violators would have been allowed to retain their
ill-gotten gains.8 6 The Court's recognition of the importance and utility of
private antitrust claims directly supports its broad interpretation of "property"
injury. As succinctly stated by one lower court, "it would be anamolous to read
the Clayton Act to exclude an action by the very person sought to,be pro87
tected."
GEORGIA JACOBSON

TORTS: INDEMNITY: MANUFACTURER OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
PRECLUDED FROM COMMON LAW INDEMNITY AGAINST
EMPLOYER OF INJURED PARTY
HoudailleIndustriesv. Edwards,374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979)
An employee of Houdaille Industries was killed by a broken cable during
the manufacture of concrete beams.1 As his survivors, the plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death action based upon breach of implied warranty against defendant, the cable manufacturer. 2 Subsequently, the defendant filed a third
party complaint for indemnity against Houdaille claiming the employer's
active negligence3 caused the employee's death. 4 Holding that breach of warranty corresponded with active negligence, the trial court granted Houdaille's
motion for summary judgment. 5 Reversing the trial court, the district court of
appeal focused on the employer's possible negligence, finding that material
issues of fact precluded summary judgment. 6 On review, the Florida supreme
86. See Brief, supranote 4, at 4.
87. Theophil v. Sheller-Glove Corp., 446 F. Supp. 131, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), leave to appeal
vacated, No. 78-7389 (2d Cir., Jan. 3, 1979).
1. Eddie Edwards was killed when a cable manufactured by Florida Wire & Cable Co.
snapped during the production of concrete beams. The beams were reinforced by a steel
cable which was stretched through a concrete mold. The cable was placed under tension by
mechanical devices known as "strand chucks." While attempting to free one of the strand
chucks, the plaintiff was struck by either the chuck or the cable, both of which snapped
forward. There was evidence, that tension in excess of the cable limitations was used to free
the chuck. Home Indem. Co. v. Edwards, 360 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978).
2. The wrongful death action was brought against Florida Wire & Cable Co. after decedent's surVivors received worker's compensation benefits from Houdaille. Houdaille Indus.,
Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1979).
3. Id. The defendant/third party plaintiff alleged that Houdaille failed to properly
conduct the detensioning process used to remove the cable from the mold. The defendant
also claimed that Houdaille failed to properly instruct its employees as to how that process
was to be performed. Finally, the manufacturer alleged that its negligence, if any, was only
passive. Id.
4. Id. Another ground for defendant's indemnity claim, apart from the active negligence
of the employer, was based on the breach of an alleged independent duty owed to it by the
employer. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. The First District Court of Appeal was presented with two questions: "First,
,whether a manufacturer of a product who is sued for breach of warranty by one injured by
the product may bring a third party suit for indemnity against the employer of the injured
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court quashed the district court's decision and HELD, that except where a
special relationship makes him "vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or
technically liable" for the wrongful acts of the employer, a manufacturer of a
defective product contributing to the job-related injury of a workman has no
right of indemnification.
Traditionally, the loss-allocation remedy of implied or common law indemnitys was the only restitutionary device available for third party actions.9
While contribution, or loss-sharing, was prohibited at common law, no such
prohibition existed regarding indemnity or loss-shifting. 10 The right to implied
indemnity inured to the defendant (the indemnitee) when his liability to the
plaintiff was derived from the conduct of a third party (the indemnitor)."
Such derivative liability arose either from substantive rules of law which required the defendant to be initially liable for the third party's negligence,12 or
party. Second, whether the third party complaint and the evidence before the court . . .are
sufficient to withstand the employer's motions for dismissal and summary judgment." 360 So.
2d at 1113. The district court answered both issues in the affirmative. As to the first issue, the
court reversed the holding of the trial court. As to the second issue, the court held that
material issues of fact existed as to whether the employer was guilty of negligence through
his misuse of the manufacturer's product. 374 So. 2d at 492.
7. 374 So. 2d at 492.
8. Indemnity can be based on an express contract, statute, or a relationship between the
parties. Implied indemnity is based on some duty or relationship between the parties which
entitles the party held liable to shift his total loss upon the party owing the duty. The RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION offers this general rule: "A person who, in whole or in part, has
discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should
have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor
is barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 76 (1937).
When speaking of indemnity, this comment refers only to implied or common law indemnity.
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 310-13 (4th ed. 1971); O'Donnell,
Implied Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a Public Policy Analysis, 6
SETON HALL L. REV. 268 (1975); Walkowiak, Implied Indemnity: A Policy Analysis of the
Total Loss Shifting Remedy in a PartialLoss Shifting Jurisdiction, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 501
(1978) (hereinafter cited as Walkowiak).
9. Restitution is based upon both the old common law action of general assumpsit and
the more modem principles of unjust enrichment and quasi-contract. The right of restitution
springs from the belief that "men should restore what comes to them by mistake or at another's expense, and that it is unfair to retain a benefit or advantage which should belong
to another." 4C PERSONAL INJURY: AcrsONs, DEFENSES, DAMAGES Indemnity § 1.01 nA
(L. Frumer & M. Friedman, ed. 1971) (hereinafter cited as PERSONAL INJURY). Similarly, the
concept underlying loss-allocation is the idea that the ultimate loss from wrongdoing should
be borne by the wrongdoer.
10. The common law rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors has been
traced to an erroneous extension of the rule in Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337
(K.B. 1799). The Merryweather rule, which denied contribution among intentional tortfeasors
acting in concert, was later extended to deny contribution among all joint tortfeasors. See
Bohlen, Contributionand Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552, 555-56 (1936);
Phillips, Contribution and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REv. 85, 95 & n.22
(1974).
11. Walkowiak, supra note 8, at 513.
12. Examples of such rules of law include: The master-servant doctrine, which holds the
master liable for the negligent torts of his servant, Saint Johns & H.R. Co. v. Shalley, 33 Fla.
397, 14 So. 890 (Fla. 1894); and the "dangerous instrumentality" rule, Southern Cotton Oil
Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
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from a duty existing between the third party and the defendant.13 Thus, the
purpose of an indemnity action was to equitably14 shift the loss from a tortfeasor, derivatively liable and without personal fault, to the negligent tortfeasor
primarily responsible for the injury.15
Distinguishing between the basic nature of the two wrongs, courts in Florida
and other jurisdictions have characterized the negligence of the indemnitee as

passive and the negligence of the indemnitor as active.' 6 Active negligence arises
when a party breaches a direct duty owed to the plaintiff which is the proxi-

mate cause of plaintiff's injury. Passive negligence arises when a party is made
liable to the plaintiff by the operation of law, solely due to the active negligence
7
of another.
In the leading case of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, s Florida's First
District Court of Appeal held that the failure of store employees to correct a
dangerous store display constructed by a third party constituted active negligence where such employees had active and timely knowledge of the negligent
construction. 9 Basing his action on the grocery store's affirmative duty to dis13. When not implied by substantive rules of law, the duty between the indemnitor and
indemnitee is based upon contract. Where the duty giving rise to implied indemnity is based
upon contract, the contract was traditionally implied by the court from the fact-situation as
a whole. Conversely, where the duty is based upon an express contract, courts no longer
speak of implied indemnity. See PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 9, at § 1.03. See generally
Walkowiak, supra note 8.
14. Although indemnity was originally based on contracts which were either express or
implied-in-fact, the modem view bases indemnity on the equitable restitutionary grounds of
unjust enrichment or quasi-contract. See note 9 supra. In Mims Crane Service, Inc. v. Inselly
Mfg.Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969), cert. denied, 234 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1969), the
court notes that although indemnity rights spring from an express or implied contract, "the
modem cases note that contract furnished too narrow a basis, and that principles of equity
furnish a more satisfactory basis for indemnity." Id. at 839. Nevertheless, the basis for the
right to indemnity under Florida law has been attributed to both contract, Stuart v. Hertz
Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974), and equity, Magnum Marine v. Kenosha Auto
Transport Corp., 481 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1973).
15. Thus, the Second District Court in Mires noted that if the vendor's liability to the
plaintiff was not based upon the vendor's negligence but rather upon ownership of the
defective product, then the vendor should not be precluded from asserting its right of action
for indemnification by the manufacturer. 226 So. 2d at 840.
16. For Florida cases, see, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co.,
275 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977); Mims
Crane Service, Inc. v. Insely Mfg. Co., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969); Olin's Rent-A-Car
Sys., Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels Inc., 187 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.) cert. denied, 194
So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1966); Great AS&P Tea Co. v. Fed. Detective Agency, Inc., 157 So. 2d 148 (Fla.
3d D.C.A. 1963), cert. denied, 165 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1964); Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin,
156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 158 So. 2d 45 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1963). For other jurisdictions, see PERSONAL INJURY supra note 9, at § 1.03[6].
17. See Walkowiak, supranote 8, at 516.
18. 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1963).
19. Id. at 51. Plaintiff was injured by broken glass when a tier of beverages collapsed. The
display was improperly constructed by Pepsi-Cola in that it was built to an excessive height
and lacked dividers between the tiers. Id. at 46. During the trial Winn-Dixie's assistant
manager testified that he watched the construction of the display on the day in question and
was aware of the dangerous condition it presented. Nevertheless, no action was taken and the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1980

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY OF.FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. xxxnI

cover and correct dangerous conditions in its store, the plaintiff claimed that
Winn-Dixie knew or should have known of the hazardous condition prior to
the accident.20 In ruling on Winn-Dixie's counterclaim against the third party
for indemnity, the court separated the grocery store's duty to the plaintiff into
two component parts. First, the duty to correct dangerous conditions previously
discovered or within the store's actual knowledge2 1 remained a direct duty
owed to the plaintiff, the breach of which would be active negligence. Second,
a duty existed to discover and correct dangerous conditions on the store
premises, such conditions being within the constructive knowledge of the defendant as implied by law.2 This second duty could be breached only if an
undiscovered dangerous condition injured the plaintiff. Based on the constructive knowledge of the defendant as implied by law, such breach was deemed
passive negligence. 23 Therefore, the court concluded that Winn-Dixie's actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition made the store actively negligent and
2
hence unable to maintain an action for indemnity. 4
The active/passive test worked effectively until the Florida supreme court
adopted pure comparative negligence.2 5 Under the comparative negligence
26
doctrine, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by his proportionate negligence.
Although designed to divide the loss on a comparative fault basis between
plaintiff and defendants, the adoption of comparative negligence suggested
display remained in such dangerous condition until plaintiff was injured 2-3 hours later. Id.
at 50.
20. Id. at 47. Because plaintiff had been a business invitee, Winn-Dixie owed him this
duty. Durden v. Drantetz, 99 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958).
21. See generally 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1963). The First District Court of Appeal
distinguished between these two duties in an implicit manner. Rather than dealing directly
with the duties themselves, the court spoke in terms of the types of knowledge chargeable to
the defendant, Winn-Dixie. Because both duties depended upon what type of knowledge the
defendant had, the court focused on whether the defendant was being charged with actual
or constructive knowledge. Contending that it had no actual knowledge, Winn-Dixie asserted
that it was not actively negligent. Rather, the defendant claimed that its liability was based
upon a constructive breach of the second duty, resulting instead in passive negligence. See
153 So. 2d at 50.
22. Id. The court noted that Winn-Dixie's position could be sustained only if the proof
established that Winn-Dixie "was itself without primary fault; that is to say, it had no actual
as distinguished from constructive knowledge that the display was built in a dangerous and
hazardous manner." Id. Because the proof showed otherwise, the court did not need to discuss
this second duty upon which Winn-Dixie based its claim for indemnity.
23. Problems often arise where courts equate active/passive negligence with active/
constructive knowledge because the court's analysis of the fact situation operates implicitly
through these concepts. This ambiguity of analysis by the courts has led writers to question
the validity of the test. See O'Donnell, supra note 8, at 274, stating that: "[S]trictly speaking,
the fact that the 'passive' defendant was held liable to the plaintiff in the first place necessarily meant that he did owe the plaintiff a duty which he violated by inaction. Therefore, the
difference between the liability of the two tortfeasors is solely one of degree, and it is difficult to reconcile that fact with the basic premise of the active-passive test that rulings can
and should be made on the basis of some distinct and critical difference in the basic nature of
the two wrongs."

24. 153 So. 2d at 51.
25.
26.

See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
280 So. 2d at 438. See generally Walkowiak, supra note 8, at 501-503.
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that indemnity could also be used to partially or comparatively shift the loss
2
solely between negligent defendants. 7

Seeking to achieve a more equitable distribution of the loss, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Stuart v. Hertz Corp.2 8 applied the comparative
indemnity concept to partially shift the loss between two negligent defendants.2 9
Although based on a persuasive minority trend,30 the Fourth District's approach was nevertheless rejected by the Florida supreme court s Confronted

with the hybrid indemnity doctrine,82 the supreme court refused to expand the
traditional indemnity action. In Stuart, the Hertz Corporation, defendant in

an automobile negligence suit, sought indemnification from plaintiff's physician, claiming the physician aggravated the plaintiff's injuries.33 Writing for
the majority, Justice Adkins clarified the elements of indemnity and distinguished indemnity from contribution. Denying any right of equitable indemnification, the majority stressed indemnity as an "all or nothing proposition,' 134 inappropriate where each tortfeasor is actively negligent. Consequently,
the court held that a party must be faultless before he can recover indemnity
from a co-defendant.

5

,

27. See Valkowiak, supra note 8, at 522. The adoption of the comparative fault doctrine,'
suggested that fault could be weighed between co-defendants, along the lines prohibited by
the common law no-contribution rule. Thus, such an approach would turn indemnity into -a
loss-sharing device, making it indistinguishable from the now-available remedy of contribution.
28. 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974), reVd, 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
29. Id. One defendant, Hertz Corp., was held vicariously liable for injuries caused by-the
operator of the Hertz automobile when it struck the plaintiff. The other defendant was the
treating physician who further complicated the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
30. See, e.g., Gertz v. Campbell, 55 111. 2d 84, 302 N.E. 2d 40 (1973) (allowing the defendant partial equitable indemnification for physician's malpractice); Herrero v. Atkinson,
227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964). (allowing the defendant
partial equitable indemnification for physician's malpractice). But see Transcon Lines v.
Barnes, 17 Ariz. App. 428, 498 P.2d. 502 (1972) (defendant was denied indemnity from medical
attendants charged with malpractice).
31. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
I,
32. Id. ,
33. Id. at 704. The driver of a Hertz auto suffered orthopedic injuries in an accident.
Vhile performing surgery on the driver, Dr. Stuart accidentally severed her carotid artery,
causing a neurological injury. Hertz sought indemnity only for those damages caused by
Stuart's malpractice.
34. Id. at 706 quoting Transcon Lines v. Barnes, 17 Ariz. App. 28, 498 P.2d 502, 509 (1972).
Justice Adkins noted that "[t]here is a fundamental distinction between indemnity and contribution. Traditionally, indemnity has evolved from the concept of express or implied con-.
tract while the doctrine of contribution has been based upon equitable rights. In the case of
indemnity the defendant is liable for the whole outlay, while in contribution he is chargeable
only with a ratable proportion." Id.

35. See 351 So. 2d at 707. Hertz was not attempting to shift its entire loss to Dr. Stuart,
but merely that portion caused by Stuart's negligence. Id. at 706. Although this claim was
similar to the distribution of loss contemplated by contribution, Hertz and Stuart were not

joint tortfeasors. Id. at 707. Therefore, because Hertz and Stuart were not joint tortfeasors,
Hertz was precluded from' utilizing the recently enacted statutory right of contribution against
Stuart. Id. at 705. Instead, Hertz was forced to advocate that indemnity should be harmonized
with.-comparative negligencp.principles, See 351 So, 2d at 706; see generally. Comment, Tort.
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Because indemnity is a general common law right based on fault, its application between the common law tort system and the no-fault worker's compensation system has raised theoretical difficulties. 36 In conflict with the exclusive liability provision of the Worker's Compensation Act,3 7 it was claimed
that the common law right of indemnity could not be asserted against employers. 38 Although early rulings upheld the employer's protection, 39 the
Florida supreme court in Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan40 ruled otherwise. Holding that the Worker's Compensation Act did not bar a passively
negligent third party from obtaining indemnity from an actively negligent1
employer, the court dismissed the employer's motion for summary judgment.4
Subsequently, the Florida legislature sought to abrogate the effect of Trail
Builders through an amendment to the Worker's Compensation Act immunizing the employer from third party actions. 42 The Florida supreme court, however, ruled this amendment unconstitutional as applied in Sunspan Engineering & Construction Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co. 43 Concerned with the
injustice of the third party's position, the majority held the application of the
statute denied third parties a right of access to the courts.44 The court recogTortfeasor Unable to Recover for Aggravation of Plaintiff's
Law -Indemnity -Original
Injury By Negligent Action of Second Tortfeasor, 6 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1441 (1978).
36. See generally, 2A A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 76 (1976 &
Supp. 1979); Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Worker's Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1035 (1977); Note,
Contribution and Indemnity: The Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 42 VA. L. REv.
959 (1956).
37. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1979) states in part: "The liability of an employer ... shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tortfeasor ..."
38. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427
(S.D. Fla. 1967); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E. 2d 768
(1953).
39. See Florida Gas Co. v. Spaulding, 226 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1969), re-'d, 243 So.
2d 129 (Fla. 1971). The First District Court of Appeal solved this case of first impression by
adopting the majority rule that the exclusivity provision bars actions against the employer
for contribution or indemnity. 226 So. 2d at 117.
40. 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970). This decision followed from a certified question submitted
to the Supreme Court by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which subsequently
denied summary judgment. See Trial Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 430 F. 2d 828, 829 (5th
Cir. 1970).
41. 235 So. 2d at 485. The court was concerned with the plight of the third party tortfeasor who did not benefit from the Act. Reasoning that FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (Supp. 1970)
affected only the rights and remedies of the employer and the employee, the court concluded
that a passive tortfeasor's common law right of indemnity against an active tortfeasor was not
abolished. Furthermore, the court noted that "[ilf it had been the legislative intent to abolish
such right, it should have been spelled out with specificity and particularity." Id.
42. 1971 Fla. Laws, ch. 71-190 (amending FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1970)).
43. 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975).
44. The court reviewed an interlocutory order of Florida's Ninth Judicial Circuit, holding
FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1972) unconstitutional as applied. Affirming the lower court,
the supreme court held that the statute arbitrarily and capriciously abolished the third party's
right to sue and thus violated both equal protection and the constitutional guarantee of access
to the courts. 310 So. 2d at 5-6. Further, the court cited Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d I (Fla.
1973), for the proposition that where the right of access to the courts has been provided by
statute or by common law predating FLA. CONsr. art. 1, § 21, the legislature is precluded from
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nized that the third party "suffers the burdens and restrictions of the Act, while
the employer receives a windfall which Trail Builders says he should not."45
Therefore, the majority concluded that a third party tortfeasor has a right of
indemnification against an employer covered by the Worker's Compensation

4
Act. 6

Due to the application of strict liability principles in products liability
actions,4 however, it was still doubtful whether a manufacturer defending a
8
products liability action could seek indemnity from the employer.A
Because
strict liability is not based on negligence, a definitive characterization of a
manufacturer's liability was necessary. In the leading Florida case of West v.
Caterpiller Tractor Co.,49 the Florida supreme court held manufacturers
strictly liable for injuries caused by defective products- but preserved the defense of comparative negligence in products liability actions.51 Adopting section
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, 52 the West court suggested that
"strict liability means negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se." 53
Although such language might be interpreted to infer active negligence, the
supreme court did not sanction such an inference. Moreover, the conflict between the language of section 402A and the opinion itself make such an inference a questionable one.5 4
Nevertheless, the Third District Court of Appeal in Spring-Lock Scaffolding
Rental Equipment Co. v. Charles Poe Masonry, Inc.,5 5 appeared to be influenced by this language. The case arose when a manufacturer filed a third party
abolishing such right without eitherproviding an alternative method for redress of injuries or
showing an overpowering public necessity for abolishing it. 310 So. 2d at 7.
45. 310 So. 2d at 7.
46. Id. at 8.
47. See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P. 2d 879, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). This landmark California case eliminated the requirement of privity
of contract in products liability cases, and adopted strict liability as an alternate theory of
recovery. Although the doctrine of strict liability in tort met with rapid and widespread
acceptance, it also raised some legal problems which are currently being encountered. A major
problem is what effect the doctrine of strict liability will have upon a defendant's right to
claim indemnification or contribution from a co-defendant or another party.
48.
49.
50.
places
have a
51.

See generally O'Donnell, supranote 8.
336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
Id. at 86. "[S]trict liability should be imposed only when a product the manufacturer
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
defect which causes injury to a human being." Id.
Id.at 92.

52. Id. at 87. § 402A provides: "A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or
design which makes it dangerous for the use for which it is manufactured is subject to liabil-

ity to others whom he should expect to use the chattel lawfully or be in the vicinity of its
probable use, for bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption
of a safe plan or design." 336 So. 2d at 86.

53. Id. at 90.
54. The fundamental inconsistency of the opinion was that the court defined strict
liability to mean negligence per se, however, §402A makes no mention of negligence. See
generally Comment, Products Liability in Florida Under Section 402A: New Language or New
Law? 29 U. FrLA. L. Rv. 398 (1977).

55. 358 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978), afJ'd, 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979).
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complaint for indemnity against the injured plaintiff's employer.5 6 In affirming
summary judgment for the employer, the district court held a manufacturer
actively negligent if found liable either for breach of implied warranty or on
grounds of strict liability.57
Thus, where the manufacturer of a defective injury-producing product
seeks indemnity from an employer, the interplay of three concepts must be
resolved. First, the standards and prerequisites of an indemnity action must be
established. 58 Second, the common law right of indemnity must be reconciled
with the exclusive liability of the employer. 59 Finally, the manufacturer's liability must be characterized as either active or passive.60
In resolving the interplay of these three concepts, the court in the instant
case clarified the role of indemnity between a manufacturer and an employer in
a products liability action. Affirming Hertz, Justice Alderman, speaking for the
court, declined to extend the traditional concept of indemnity. 61 Focusing on
the indemnitee and requiring him to be faultless, the court insured there would
be no weighing of relative fault.62 Resolving ambiguities in terminology, the
instant case stressed that the active/passive test refers only to "fault or no
fault." 63 Consequently, the court concluded there could be no indemnity be64
tween joint tortfeasors.
Reasoning that indemnity inures to a party liable in the absence of fault,
the court ruled a prospective indemnitee must plead vicarious liability.65
Furthermore, the instant case held "in the absence of a contract," no duty
exists between the user and supplier of an item "so as to create a duty upon
the user to indemnify the supplier." 66 Justice Alderman concluded that the
manufacturer's assertion that Houdaille's negligence was the sole cause of the

56. Id. Spring-Lock, the lessor-manufacturer, was sued by the general contractor's employee, who was involved in a fall from a scaffold. Id. at 85.
57. Id.
58. See notes 16-35 supra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 36-45 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 46-57 supra and accompanying text. See also O'Donnell, supra note 8, at
281-82, noting that: "The leading texts lend themselves to the arguments of either side. For instance, the alleged misconduct of the manufacturer could be characterized just as well as either
(a) an 'active failure' ...[in designing defective products] ...or (b) the 'passive failure' of not
taking some action which would have prevented the active wrongdoing of a third party
For a list of cases holding either one way or the other see id. at 280 n.86.
61. 374 So. 2d at 493.
62. Id. The court repudiated the result reached by the district court in Home Indemnity
because the district court used the active/passive test to weigh the fault of the employer
against the fault of the manufacturer. Id.
63. Justice Alderman noted that confusion has arisen over the "use of the labels employed
to designate the conduct of the parties which will permit the party seeking indemnity to
recover." Id.
64. Id. The concept of "joint" tortfeasors refers to the use of indemnity between two
parties, both of whom are at fault. Because no one should be permitted to found a cause of
action on his own wrongdoing, the courts have traditionally declined to aid one tortfeasor
against another. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d at 705.
65. 374 So. 2d at 493.
66. Id. at 494.
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injury was insufficient to establish an indemnity claim.67 In the absence of
vicarious liability, the manufacturer's claim constituted a complete defense to
the original action. 68
The instant case distinguished between the prerequisites to an indemnity
action 69 and immunity on the basis of an employer's exclusivity.70 Claiming the
lower court misconstrued Sunspan and Trail Builders, Justice Alderman asserted that those cases only eliminated an employer's immunity from an other1
wise viable indemnity action.7
Returning to a consideration of the viability of the defendant's action, the
court cited Spring-Lock for the proposition that a manufacturer of a defective
product is actively negligent i'f held liable on grounds of negligence, implied
warranty, or strict liability.2 An unfavorable verdict in the main action would
be conclusive of negligence, and therefore preclude the defendant from -indemnity.7 3 The court noted hoWever, that before the plaintiff could prevail,
West required proof of a defect in the product which proximately caused the
plaintiff's injury.7-

Although not expressly precluding a manufacturer of a defective product
from common law indemnity, the practical effect of the instant case'Would be
to confine the products liability proceeding to the initial action.7 5 On one hand,
the court required an indemnitee to be faultless. On the other hand, a finding
of liability in the main action would be tantamount to finding the manufacturer actively negligent. Thus, the manufacturer faces a Hobson's choice.
Despite holding that a "special relationship" between the manufacturer and
the employer could make the manufacturer vicariously liable,76 the instant case
abrogated any non-contractual duty of care between the two upon which such
a relationship could be based."7 Consequently, the preclusion of contribution's
67. Id. at 493. The complaint was insufficient because Florida Wire did not allege that'it

was faultless or that its liability was vicarious or derivative. Id.
68. Id. at 493-94. If Houdaille were found totally at fault and Florida Wire were found
faultless, the plaintiff could not recover against Florida Wire because no legal relationship
exists by which Houdaille's negligence could be atributed to Florida Wire. Id.

69. Id. The court held these requirements to be: (1) that the indemnitee must be faultless, and (2) that the indemnitee must be held technically or vicariously liable for the wrong-

ful act of another. Id.
70. Id. ai 494 n.4.
71. Id.
72.

Id. at 494 n.l.

73. See 374 So. 2d at 493-94. The court noted that a different situation would exist where
the defective component was made by a component manufacturer and later incorporated into
the product. In this situation, a manufacturer held liable for breach of warranty could be
without fault and therefore able to claim indemnity from the supplier. Id. at 493-94 n.3.
74. Id. at 493-94. The court further noted that a manufacturer is not an
insurer for all
physical injuries caused by its products. Id. at 493.
75. The manufacturer's right of access to the indemnity action has not been precluded;
instead the court has made it impossible for the manufacturer to meet the prerequisites necessary fbr such action. Id. at 494 n.4.
76. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
78.. Although the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-108,
amended by 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-186, codified as FA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977), has overridden
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and a finding of no pre-existing duty denies the manufacturer any avenue of
9
loss-allocation7
The inequity of this result has prompted some jurisdictions to allow contribution despite the lack of "common liability" required between the manufacturer and the employer.8 0 Other jurisdictions have mitigated the inequity by
reducing the employee's recovery by the amount of worker's compensation
benefits received81 While preserving traditional indemnity theory, the latter
solution removes part of the burden borne by the manufacturer8s
Although both of these theories are viable alternatives to the instant decision, neither was mentioned by the court. Significantly, the opinion totally
lacked a discussion of policy considerations.8 3 Such an apparent lack of concern
for policy, when combined with the implicit nature of the court's holding, may
suggest the court made a policy choice, albeit unstated, to let the manufacturer
continue to bear the burden of the risks generated by his enterprise.
In situations analogous to the instant case, ' manufacturers would be
the common law no-contribution rule, the manufacturer is still barred from receiving contribution because of the employer's immunity. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 47, at 277, which
states: "The contribution defendant must be a tortfeasor, and originally liable to the plaintiff.
If there was never any such liability, as where he has the defense of family immunity . . . or
the substitution of workmen's compensation for common law liability, then he is not liable
for contribution." Although the case of Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977) held that
the doctrine of interspousal immunity did not preclude contribution among joint tortfeasors,
the empolyer's exclusivity has remained intact. For Florida cases which uphold the employer's
immunity from contribution, see Seaboard Coastline R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978);
Firestone Tire &Rubber Co. v. Thompson Aircraft Tire Corp., 353 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1977); Blaw-Knox Food & Chem. Equip. Co. v. Holmes, 348 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977);
United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 334 So. 2d 310 (Fla. Ist D.C.A.), cert. denied, 341
So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1976). See also 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW

OF

WORKMIEN'S

COMPENSATION

§

76.21

at 14-295 (1974).
79. The idea that the manufacturer must bear the full burden of loss resulting from a
manufacturing defect is at odds with the principle of comparative fault. Because the supreme
court has previously preserved the defense of comparative negligence in products liability
actions, comparative fault principles should be applicable between co-defendants. See text
accompanying note 51 supra.
80. See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y.
1972).
81. See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974); Tate v. Superior Ct.,
213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1963); Hunsucker v. High Point Bending &
Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 1953).
82. This approach has been called a "load sharing" approach. It does not extend the employer's liability past the limitations of the compensation act and it gives the manufacturer
some relief. See Davis, Third-Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation-Covered Employers Are Negligent - Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead? 4 HoFSxrA L. Rav. 571, 573 (1976).
83. The instant case might be characterized as a clarification of indemnity rules in general
in a case which just happened to be between an employer and a manufacturer. However, the
situation is multi-faceted and demands specific treatment of all the issues presented.
84. The situation in the instant case could be called a "three cornered suit" in which the
compensation system and the tort system interact. In one corner is the plaintiff, an injured
compensation-covered employee. In the other corner is the defendant, a third party tortfeasor,
usually a manufacturer. In the last corner is the third party defendant, the employer who is
allegedly negligent yet immune due to his no-fault liability under the Workers' Compensation Act.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss2/7

10

Charlip: Manufacturer of Defective Product Precluded from Common Law Indem
1980]

CASE COMMENTS

forced to bear the whole cost of the employee's injury, although the employer's
fault is greater. Furthermore, because the employer has a right of subrogation
to the employee's recovery, in effect, the manufacturer reimburses the employer
for his compensation expense.85 Consequently, the instant decision provides no
incentive for the employer to reduce injury-producing conditions in the workplace8s
Such an incentive might have been preserved had the court implied a duty
between the manufacturer and the employerST By prohibiting the negligent
employer from recouping his worker's compensation payments through subrogation, the court could have mitigated the manufacturer's subsidization of the
worker's compensation system. Similarly, by allowing contribution the court
could have placed some loss-sharing responsibility on the employer.88 Although
these remedies might be better suited for legislative determination, 9 the court
in the instant case might have raised such remedial alternatives.
The instant court purported to clarify all the ambiguities surrounding the
proper use of indemnity. Basing its decision on prior precedent, the court ap-.
peared to reach a consistent result. However, closer examination reveals the
instant decision accomplishes the unconstitutional result prohibited by Sunspan.90 Although the court did not address the issue directly, the likelihood of
a manufacturer receiving indemnity from an employer has become virtually
impossible.9 1 The instant decision differs from Sunspan however, in that the
former precludes the manufacturer from indemnity because of his implied
negligence,92 while the latter precludes the manufacturer because of the employer's exclusive liability. Rather than abrogating the manufacturer's common
85. F.A.

STAT.

§ 440.39(2) (1979) (subrogation rights of employer or employer's insurer).

86. However, any amounts recovered by an employer or his insurance carrier are required
to be credited against the employer's loss experience. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(6) (1979). Thus, the

rise in an employer's rates is the only incentive he has to prevent injury-producing risks. If
the main goal of the comparative fault system is the deterrence of injury producing conduct,

the instant decision is in contradiction to the purposes of the system. Although the distribution of secondary costs of accidents is another goal of the system, there is no evidence that
manufacturers are better secondary cost distributors than employers. See generally Walkowiak,
supra note 8, at 526-27.
87. Such a duty could be based on the concept of unjust enrichment. The negligent
employer would be unjustly enriched by being reimbursed for his compensation payments.

Therefore, in such situations the courts should discount the manufacturer's liability by the
subrogated amount. See generally Weisgall, supra note 33.

88. However, the employer's expectation of limited liability would be destroyed. More
importantly, the legislative endorsement of the employer's limited liability would be circumvented.
89. See Larson, Worker's Compensation: Third Party'sAction Over Against Employer, 65
Nw. U.L. Rav. 351, 420 (1970).
1 90. See 310 So. 2d at 7. While remaining true to the traditional prerequisites necessary
for an action of indemnification, the court neglected the position in which it put a particular

third party, i.e., the manufacturer. Thus, judicial construction has accomplished that which
the supreme court said the legislature could not do constitutionally. Id.
91. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
92. Upon a determination of liability for breach of warranty or strict liability, the manufacturer is presumed to be actively negligent. The court equates negligence per se with active
negligence. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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